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Abstract— We develop an algorithm capable of compress-
ing large networks into a smaller ones with similar control
plane behavior: For every stable routing solution in the large,
original network, there exists a corresponding solution in
the compressed network, and vice versa. Our compression
algorithm preserves a wide variety of network properties
including reachability, loop freedom, and path length. Con-
sequently, operators may speed up network analysis, based
on simulation, emulation, or verification, by analyzing only
the compressed network. Our approach is based on a new
theory of control plane equivalence. We implement these
ideas in a tool called Bonsai and apply it to real and synthetic
networks. Bonsai can shrink real networks by over a factor
of 5 and speed up analysis by several orders of magnitude.
1 INTRODUCTION
Configuration errors are a leading cause of network outages
and security breaches [2, 20, 27, 32, 34, 39]. For instance, a
recent misconfiguration disrupted Internet connectivity for
millions of users in the USA for over 1.5 hours, and similar
incidents last year impacted users in Japan, India, Brazil,
Azerbaijan, and beyond [6].
The root cause of many of these errors is simply complex-
ity: Networks typically run one or more distributed routing
protocols that exchange information about available paths
to destinations. The paths that are advertised and preferred
by routers are determined by their configuration files, which
can easily contain tens of thousands of low-level, vendor-
specific primitives. Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible for
human network operators to reason about the correctness
of these files, let alone that of behavior that results from
distributed interactions between many routers.
To minimize errors in configurations, researchers have
taken a number of approaches to find bugs and check correct-
ness, including static analysis [4, 15], simulation [16, 18], em-
ulation [30], monitoring [24, 25, 28, 43], model checking [36],
systematic testing [14, 38], and verification [5, 19, 41]. Yet
for almost all such techniques, scaling to large networks
remains challenging. For example, in Batfish [18], a testing
tool, the time it takes to model control plane dynamics limits
the number of tests that can be administered. Similarly, the
cost of the verification tool Minesweeper [5] grows expo-
nentially in the worst case, and in practice, tops out at a few
hundred devices—far short of the 1000+ devices that are used
to operate many modern data centers.
In this paper, we tackle these problems by defining a new
theory of control plane equivalence and using it to compress
large, concrete networks into smaller, abstract networks with
equivalent behavior. Because our compression techniques
preserve many properties of the network control plane, in-
cluding reachability, path length, and loop freedom, analysis
tools of all kinds can operate (quickly) on the smaller net-
works, rather than their large concrete counterparts. In other
words, this theory is an effective complement to ongoing
work on network analysis, capable of helping accelerate a
wide variety of analysis tools. Moreover, because our trans-
formations are bisimulations, rather than over- or under-
approximations, tools built on our theory can avoid both
unsound inferences and false positives.
Intuitively, the reason it is possible to compress control
planes in this fashion is that large networks tend to contain
quite a bit of structural symmetry—if not, they would be even
harder to manage. For instance, many spine (or leaf or aggre-
gation) routers in a data center may be similarly configured;
and, as we show later, symmetries exist in backbone network
as well. Recently, Plotkin et al. [35] exploited similar intu-
ition to develop other tools for network verification. How-
ever, they operate over the (stateless) network data plane,
i.e., the packet-forwarding rules, whereas we operate over
the control plane, i.e., the protocols that distribute the avail-
able routes. While both the data and control planes process
messages (data packets and routing messages, respectively),
the routing messages interact with one another whereas the
data packets do not. More specifically, data packet process-
ing depends only on the static packet-forwarding rules of a
router; it does not depend on other data packets. In contrast,
routing messages interact: the presence and timing of one
(more preferred) message can cause another (less preferred)
message to be ignored. Such interactions create dynamics not
present in stateless data planes and can even lead to many
different routing solutions for the same network. In other
work, Wang et al. [40] also observed that compression can
lead to improved control plane analysis performance, and
they designed an algorithm for compressing BGP networks
that can speed analysis of convergence behavior. In contrast,
our algorithms are designed to preserve arbitrary path prop-
erties of networks. Such properties include reachability, loop
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freedom, absence of black holes and access control. We also
define our algorithms over a generic protocol model so we
can apply the ideas to a wide range of protocols ranging
from BGP to OSPF to static routes.
More specifically, we make two core contributions:
A Theory of Control Plane Equivalence. Our theoretical
development begins by defining the Stable Routing Problem
(SRP), a generic model of a routing protocol and the network
on which it runs. SRPs can model networks running a wide
variety of protocols including distance-vector, link-state, and
path-vector protocols. SRPs are directly inspired by the stable
paths problems (SPP) [21], but rather than describing the
protocols’ final solution using end-to-end paths (as SPPs
do), SRPs describe runtime routing behavior in terms of
local processing of routing messages, as configurations do.
In addition to modeling raw configurations more closely, this
distinction allows SRPs to capture a wider variety of routing
behaviors that emerge at runtime, including static routing
and other protocols that may generate loops. Consequently,
our formulation of SRPs is similar to the protocolmodels used
by routing algebras [22, 37], though this earlier work focused
on convergence rather than network compression or analysis
of topologically-sensitive properties such as reachability.
With a network model in hand, we turn to the process
of characterizing network transformations. Intuitively, we
would like to define transformations that convert concrete
networks into abstract ones that make equivalent control
decisions and generate similar forwarding behavior. How-
ever, doing so directly is challenging as validating that two
SRPs are equivalent is as hard as the control plane verifica-
tion problem we are trying to speed up in the first place!
We address this challenge by defining a class of network
transformations that we call effective abstractions. These ab-
stractions are characterized by conditions designed to be
checked efficiently, and locally, without the need for a global
simulation. Our central theoretical result is that these con-
ditions imply behavioral equivalence of the concrete and
abstract networks.
An Efficient Compression Algorithm. Our theory paves
the way for a practical algorithm for automatically comput-
ing compact, abstract control planes from configurations
of large networks. The algorithm is based on abstraction
refinement: Starting with the coarsest possible abstraction
it iteratively refines the abstract network, checking at each
step to determine whether or not it has found an effective
abstraction. To implement such checks efficiently, we use a
variety of efficient data structures such as Binary Decision
Diagrams to represent configuration semantics. In practice,
the algorithm reduces network sizes significantly, bringing
more networks into range for various analyses. For example,
our tool was able to compress an operational 196-node data
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Figure 1: An example RIP network.
center network down to 26 nodes and to reduce the number
of edges by a factor of roughly 100. A 1086-node WAN using
eBGP, iBGP, OSPF and static routes was compressed down
to 137 nodes and its edge count was reduced by a factor 7.
2 OVERVIEW
The Stable Routing Problem. Intuitively, a network is just
a graph G where nodes are routers and edges are links be-
tween them. The network’s control plane has a collection of
router-local rules that determine how routing messages are
processed. Different routing protocols use different kinds of
messages. For instance, in RIP, a simple distance-vector pro-
tocol, messages include destination prefix and hop count. In
contrast, BGP messages include a destination prefix, an AS-
path, a local preference and other optional data. We call all
such messages attributes regardless of their contents. While
routing protocols differ significantly in many respects, they
can be factored into two generic parts: (1) a comparison rela-
tion that prefers certain attributes, and (2) a transfer function
that transforms incoming and outgoing messages.
An SRP instance assembles all of these ingredients: (1)
a graph defining the network topology, (2) a destination
to which to route, (3) a set of attributes, (4) an attribute
comparison relation, and (5) an attribute transfer function.
Its solution (L) associates an attribute with each node, which
represents the route chosen by the node. Every SRP solution
has the property that nodes have not been offered an attribute
by a neighbor that is preferred more than the chosen one.
An SRP solution also implicitly defines a forwarding relation:
If a receives its chosen attribute from b, then a will forward
traffic to b. There can be multiple solutions to an SRP.
As an example, consider the RIP network in Figure 1(a).
The destination node is d. It initiates the protocol by send-
ing messages that contain the hop count to the destination.
The RIP comparison relation prefers the minimal attribute
(i.e., the shortest path to the destination). The RIP transfor-
mation function adds one to each attribute along each link.
Figure 1(b) shows the resulting solution.
Network Abstractions. Our goal is to define an algorithm
that, given one SRP, computes a new, smaller SRP that ex-
hibits “similar” control plane behavior. We call the input SRP
the concrete network, and the output SRP the abstract network.
A network abstraction defines precisely the relationship be-
tween the two. It is a pair of functions (f , h), where f is a
topology abstraction that maps the nodes and edges of the
concrete network to those of the abstract network, and h is
an attribute abstraction that maps the concrete attributes in
control plane messages to abstract ones.
We define "similarity" using control plane solutions that
emerge after running a routing protocol. More precisely, two
networks are control-plane equivalent (CP-equivalent) when:
There is a solution L to the concrete network iff there is
a solution L̂ to the abstract network where (i) routers are
labeled with similar attributes, as defined by the attribute
abstraction; and (ii) packets are forwarded similarly, as
defined by the topology abstraction.
CP-equivalence is powerful because it preserves many
properties such as reachability, path length, way-pointing,
and loop-freedom. Moreover, because the connection be-
tween abstract and concrete networks is tight (i.e., a bisim-
ulation) as opposed to an over-approximation, bugs found
when verifying the abstract network, correspond to real bugs
in the concrete network (i.e., no false positives). Likewise,
because our abstractions are not under-approximations, if
we verify that there are no violations of a property in the
abstract network, then there are no violations of the property
in the concrete network (i.e., no false negatives).
Figure 1(c) shows a CP-equivalent abstraction of the exam-
ple network. The topology abstraction f maps the concrete
node a to â, b1 and b2 to b̂, and d to d̂ , while the attribute
abstraction h is simply the identity function, leaving hop
count unchanged. The abstraction is CP-equivalent because
there is only one stable solution to both abstract and concrete
networks, and given a concrete node n, the label associated
with that node is the same as the label associated with f (n).
For instance, b1 is labeled with attribute 1 and so is b̂, its
corresponding node in the abstraction. One can also observe
that the forwarding relation in the concrete network is equiv-
alent (modulo f ) to the forwarding relation in the abstract
network. For instance, concrete node b1 forwards to d and
the corresponding abstract node b̂ forwards to d̂ as well.
Effective Abstractions.While CP-equivalence is our goal,
we cannot evaluate pairs of networks for equivalence directly—
naively, one would have to simulate the behavior of the pair
of networks on all possible inputs, an infeasible task. Instead,
we formulate a set of conditions on network abstractions
that imply CP-equivalence and can be evaluated efficiently.
Effective abstractions are those that satisfy these conditions.
While these conditions help us identify abstractions for
protocols such as RIP and OSPF, there is a serious complica-
tion for BGP. One of the conditions is transfer-equivalence,
i.e., the routing information is transformed in a similar way
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Figure 2: (a) Concrete BGP network. (b) Unsound ab-
straction (has a loop). (c) Sound abstraction.
in concrete and abstract networks. However, BGP routers
employ an implicit loop-prevention mechanism that rejects
routes that contain their own AS (Autonomous System, an
identifier for the network) number. Consequently, even when
two routers have identical configurations, their transfer func-
tions are slightly different because they reject different paths.
To handle this complication, we define a refined set of
conditions, called the BGP-effective conditions. These condi-
tions can also imply CP-equivalence and can be evaluated
efficiently, though the relationship between abstract and con-
crete networks is more sophisticated; the function mapping
nodes in the concrete to the abstract networks is not fixed but
instead depends on the (one of possibly multiple) solutions
to which the control plane converges.
More precisely, given a concrete SRP and an effective ab-
straction, which produces ŜRP , a BGP-effective abstraction
provides an intermediate network SRP . This intermediate
network is similar to ŜRP except that an abstract node n̂ in
ŜRP is split into several nodes—one for each possible forward-
ing behavior of n̂. Importantly, we prove that the number
of instances node n̂ needs to be split into, is bounded by
k , where k is the number of different local preference val-
ues that the concrete nodes may use. (Operators use local
preferences to implement policy-based path selection).
Figure 2 shows a situation in which these sorts of diffi-
culties arise. Assume the middle routers (b1, b2, b3) of the
concrete network have identical configurations and prefer
to route traffic down rather than up. Despite this prefer-
ence, one of the three must route upwards. In the figure, b1
happens to be that router. This solution is stable—no router
receives a route from a neighbor that it prefers to the current
route (if router b1 were to receive a route from a, the path
to d would be b1.a.b1.d , a loop which b1 would reject). And
yet, despite identical configurations, routers b1 and b2 for-
ward in different directions. Figure 2(b) shows a naive (and
incorrect) abstraction in which all three of b1, b2 and b3 are
collapsed to the same node. This abstract network in (b) is
not CP-equivalent to the network in (a), because mapping
the solution to (a) in (b) requires generating a forwarding
loop. However, there does exist a smaller CP-equivalent ab-
stract network—the network depicted in Figure 2(c). The
latter network is capable of mapping the solution depicted
in Figure 2(a) without introducing a forwarding loop.
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Figure 3: Abstraction refinement for the network in
Figure 2(a). Boxes represent abstract nodes.
From Theory to Practice. Our theory provides the basis
for developing an efficient algorithm for control plane com-
pression. Based on abstraction refinement, our algorithm first
generates the coarsest possible abstraction and then repeat-
edly splits abstract nodes until the resulting network satisfies
the conditions of an (BGP-)effective abstraction.
Figure 3 visualizes the algorithm on the BGP network of
Figure 2(a). As a first step in Figure 3(a), we generate the
coarsest possible abstraction: the destination is represented
alone as one abstract node and all other nodes are grouped
in a separate abstract node. This first abstraction is not an
effective abstraction—it does not satisfy a topological condi-
tion requiring that all concrete nodes (b1, b2, b3, a) associated
with one abstract node have edges to some concrete node
(d) in an adjacent abstract node. In this case, concrete node
a does not satisfy the condition. It is thus necessary to refine
the abstraction by separating nodes b1, b2, and b3 from a.
Figure 3(b) presents the second refinement step, where
the topological condition is satisfied but the BGP-effective
conditions are not: The nodes b1, b2, and b3 use one non-
default BGP local preference to prefer routing down rather
than up and as a consequence each node may exhibit up
to two possible behaviors. Consequently, we must split the
abstract node for b1, b2, and b3 into two separate nodes. We
do not know statically the mapping of concrete to abstract
nodes, so our visualization places all three concrete nodes in
each abstract node to represent all possible mappings.
Figure 3(c) happens to satisfy all conditions of a BGP-
effective abstraction. Consequently, the refinement process
terminates. The final abstraction includes 4 abstract nodes
and 4 total edges—a reduction in size from our concrete
network with 5 nodes and 6 edges. Although this simple
example does not show much reduction, as we show later,
significant reductions are possible in larger networks.
Onward. The following sections describe our approach in
detail. §3 formalizes the SRP, §4 defines effective abstractions,
and §5 describes the compression algorithm. Throughout the
paper there are many theorems. The proofs of these theorems
can be found in the appendix.
3 STABLE ROUTING PROBLEM
An SRP formally captures all the routing behaviors that a
network can exhibit. We first define it formally and then
outline how it can model common routing protocols.
3.1 Definition and Solutions
We define one SRP per destination in the network. As shown
in Figure 4, an SRP instance is a tuple (G,A,ad,≺, trans).
Here,G = (V ,E,d) is a graph with a set of verticesV , a set of
directed edges E : V ×V , and a destination vertex d ∈ V .A is
a set of attributes that describe the fields of routing messages.
For example, when modeling BGP, A might represent tuples
of a 32-bit local-preference value, a set of 16-bit community
values, and a list of ASes representing the AS path. We also
define a new set A⊥ = A ∪ {⊥}, which adds a special value
⊥ to represent the absence of an attribute (routing message).
Further, the special attribute value ad represents the initial
protocol message advertised by the destination d .
In the SRP instance, ≺ is a partial order that compares
attributes and models the routing decision procedure that
compares routes using some combination of message fields.
If attribute a1 ≺ a2, then a1 is more desirable. Finally, trans
represents the transfer function that describes how attributes
are modified (or dropped) between routers. Given an edge
and an attribute from the neighbor across the edge, it deter-
mines what new attribute is received at the current node.
The transfer function depends on both the routing protocol
and node’s configuration.
Well-formed SRPs. In an SRP, the ≺ relation and trans func-
tion can compare andmodify attributes arbitrarily.While this
generality helps model a wide variety of routing protocols,
it also allows nonsensical behaviors. We define well-formed
SRPs as those with two practical properties: (1) self-loop-
freedom: The graphmust not contain self loops: ∀v .(v,v) < E.
(2) non-spontaneity: If a neighbor has no route to the destina-
tion, then a router will not obtain a route from that neighbor.
While useful, non-spontaneity is not necessary for all of our
theoretical results (e.g., see SRPs for static routing).
Solutions. Given an SRP instance, we can describe its (pos-
sibly multiple) solutions. Intuitively, each solution is derived
from a set of constraints that requires that each node be
locally stable, i.e., it has no incentive to deviate from its cur-
rently chosen neighbor. For shortest path routing, an SRP
solution will be a rooted tree where each node points to the
neighbor with the shortest path. For policy-based routing
such as BGP, the paths may not be the shortest paths.
Formally, an SRP solution is an attribute labeling L : V →
A that maps each node to a final route (attribute) chosen to
forward traffic. The labeling L must satisfy the constraints
shown in Figure 4 (lower left). The labeling of the destination
SRP instance SRP = (G, A, ad, ≺, trans)
G = (V , E, d ) network topology
V topology vertices
E : V ×V topology edges
d : V destination vertex
A routing attributes
A⊥ = A ∪ {⊥} attributes or no attribute
ad : A⊥ initial route
≺ ⊆ A × A comparison relation
trans : E × A⊥ → A⊥ transfer function
Properties of well-formed SRPs
∀v . (v, v) < E self-loop-free
∀e . trans(e, ⊥) = ⊥ non-spontaneous
SRP solution L : V → A
L(u) =

ad u = d
⊥ attrsL (u) = ∅
a ∈ attrsL (u) that is minimal by (≺), attrsL (u) , ∅
attrsL (u) = {a | (e, a) ∈ choicesL (u)}
choicesL (u) = {(e, a) | e = (u, v), a = trans(e, L(v)), a , ⊥}
fwdL (u) = {e | (e, a) ∈ choicesL (u), a ≈ L(u)}
a1 ≈ a2 ⇐⇒ a1 ⊀ a2 ∧ a2 ⊀ a1
Network abstraction (f , h) : (V → V̂ ) × (A→ Â)
SRP = (G, A, ad, ≺, trans) concrete SRP instanceSRP = (Ĝ, Â, âd, ≺̂, trans) abstract SRP instance
u 7→ û ≡ f (u) = û vertex abstraction notation
a 7→ â ≡ h(a) = â attribute abstraction notation
Effective abstractions
(d 7→ d̂ ) ∧ (∀d ′. d , d ′ =⇒ d ′ ̸7→ d̂ ) dest-equivalence
h(ad ) = âd orig-equivalence
∀a . h(a) = ⊥ ⇐⇒ a = ⊥ drop-equivalence
∀a, b . a ≺ b ⇐⇒ h(a) ≺̂ h(b) rank-equivalence
∀e, a . h(trans(e, a)) = trans(f (e), h(a)) trans-equivalence
∀u, v . (u, v) ∈ E ⇒ (û, v̂) ∈ Ê ∀∃−abstraction1
∀û, v̂ . (û, v̂) ∈ Ê ⇒ (∀u . u 7→ û ⇒ ∃v . v 7→ v̂ ∧ (u, v) ∈ E) ∀∃−abstraction2
BGP-effective abstractions
∀u, v . (u, v) ∈ E ⇐⇒ (û, v̂) ∈ Ê ∀∀−abstraction
∀e, a . e = (u, v) ∧ v < a .path =⇒ transfer-approx
h(trans(e, a)) = trans(f (e), h(a))
CP-equivalence SRP ≡SRP
L ∈ SRP ⇐⇒ L̂ ∈SRP when:
1. ∀u . h(L(u)) = L̂(f (u)) label-equivalence
2. ∀u, v . (u, v) ∈ fwdL (u) ⇐⇒ (û, v̂) ∈ f̂wdL̂ (û) fwd-equivalence
Figure 4: Technical cheat sheet. Definitions for SRPs, solutions, abstractions, and abstraction properties.
node should be the special attribute ad. If there are no at-
tributes available from neighbors (attrsL(u) = ∅), then node
u has no route to the destination (⊥). Otherwise, L(u) is cho-
sen to be an attribute choice that is minimal according to the
comparison relation (≺). If there is more than one minimal
attribute, then any value can be chosen. The set of attributes
at a node stems from the choices from neighbors: for each
edge e = (u,v) from u, apply the transfer function from the
neighbor’s label to obtain a new attribute a = trans(e,L(v)),
ignoring any attributes that get dropped (a = ⊥).
Given an SRP solution, it is easy to determine the forward-
ing behavior. We define fwdL(u) as the set of edges e such
that the attribute learned from e is equal to the best choice
L(u) at u. The attribute need not be exactly L(u), but must
be at least as good (≈). If there is more than one such choice,
then a node may forward to multiple neighbors.
3.2 Modeling Common Routing Protocols
SRP can faithfully model common routing protocols. For ease
of exposition, assume for now that the network runs only
one routing protocol; we consider multi-protocol networks
and other configuration primitives in §6.
RIP (distance vector). RIP uses shortest paths to the desti-
nation based on hop count. The attributes, representing the
path length, are A = {0..15} as RIP uses a maximum path
length of 16; the destination attribute ad is 0; the compari-
son relation prefers shorter paths; and the transfer function
drops a route if it exceeds the hop count limit and increments
the path length otherwise.
OSPF (link state). Open Shortest Path First is a popular
link state protocol where routers exchange link cost informa-
tion and compute the least-cost path to the destination. The
attribute set A = N is any natural number and represents
paths cost; the comparison relation compares this cost; and
the transfer function adds the (configured) link cost. A large
OSPF network may be split into multiple areas and prefer
intra-area routes over inter-area ones. We model this behav-
ior using attributes that are tuples of the path cost and a
boolean that indicates whether it is an inter-area route. The
comparison relation prioritizes intra-area routes followed
by path cost, and the transfer function changes the boolean
value when crossing an inter-area edge.
BGP (path vector). BGP is a widely-used path-vector pro-
tocol that provides flexibility for configuring policy and com-
puting non-shortest paths. We assume here that all routers
use their own AS number, i.e., eBGP (as in large data cen-
ters [29]) and discuss iBGP in §6. We model eBGP using
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Figure 5: Modeling BGP with SRP.
A = N × 2N × list(V ), where the components are: (1) a local
preference value, (2) a collection of community tags, and (3)
a list of nodes defining the AS path. (Other BGP attributes
such as MEDs or origin type can be modeled similarly, but
are omitted for simplicity.) BGP’s comparison function first
compares local-preference followed by the AS path length.
Its transfer function appends the current AS to the AS path
when exporting a route. It also drops attributes that form a
loop when the current node is present in the AS path. Other-
wise, the router’s policy, per its configuration, is applied.
Figure 5 shows an example, where a.lp and a.path denote
components of an attribute a = (lp, tags, path). Assume that
in this network b2 prefers going through a to reach destina-
tion d and that this policy is achieved by configuring a to add
tag 1 to outgoing messages and configuring b2 to prefer this
tag. The configuration-driven part of the transfer function is
shown in the boxes for routers a and b2. Router a adds the
tag 1 to attributes it exports; and b2 checks for this tag, and
if present, assigns a higher (better) local preference value
than the default value (100), which ensures that b2 prefers
to go through a. The arrows in the figure indicate the final
forwarding behavior of this network, and a solution labeling
L is shown next to each node.
Static routing. Operators configure static routes that de-
scribe which interface to use for a given destination. Figure 6
shows an example where routers a and b2 are configured
with static routes. We model static routing using the set of
attributesA = {true} which indicates the presence of a static
route. Since there is only one attribute, the comparison rela-
tion is trivially empty. The transfer function does not depend
on the neighbor at all; it returns true if there is a static route
configured locally along an edge and ⊥ otherwise.
4 EFFECTIVE ABSTRACTIONS
Wenowbuild on SRPs to describe the theory and implications
of effective network abstractions.
Network abstractions. We start by formalizing network
abstractions. A network abstraction relates two SRPs—a
concrete SRP = (G,ad ,A,≺, trans) and an abstract ŜRP =
! "# $"%
⊥
true
⊥true A = {true}!/ 	=⊥trans e,a =		 If  SR on e
otherwise
1	6		⊥SR	to	b% SR	to	d
Figure 6: Modeling Static routing with SRP.
(Ĝ, âd , Â, ≺̂, trans)—using a pair of functions (f ,h). The topol-
ogy function f : V → V̂ maps each concrete graph node to
an abstract graph node, and the attribute function h : A→ Â
maps each concrete attribute to an abstract one. For conve-
nience, we will write u 7→ û to mean f (u) = û, and a 7→ â
to mean h(a) = â. We also freely apply f to edges and paths:
given an edge e = (u,v), f (e) means (f (u), f (v)); given a
path u1, . . . ,un , f (u1, . . . ,un) means f (u1), . . . , f (un).
Attribute abstraction allows the set of attributes to differ
between the concrete and abstract networks. This ability may
be used to convert attributes with concrete nodes into those
with related abstract nodes. For example, in the BGP network
in Figure 7, f maps bi nodes to the abstract node b̂, while h
maps the concrete AS path to its abstract counterpart.
4.1 Effective Abstraction Conditions
In a network abstraction, f and h can be arbitrary functions,
but we are interested only in abstractions that preserve the
control plane behavior of the concrete network. An effective
abstraction satisfies a set of relatively easy-to-check condi-
tions that imply CP-equivalence. These conditions, listed in
the middle right of Figure 4, are restrictions on the topology
function f and the attribute function h.
Topology abstraction conditions. Effective topology func-
tions obey two conditions. First, they preserve the identity of
the destination node (dest-equivalence). That is, the concrete
destination node, and only this node, should be mapped
to the abstract destination: d 7→ d̂ , d ′ ̸7→ d̂ . Second, the
topological mapping as a whole must be a (forall-exists)
∀∃−abstraction. A ∀∃−abstraction (both ∀∃−abstraction1
and ∀∃−abstraction2) demands that: (1) for every concrete
edge (u,v) there is a corresponding abstract edge (û, v̂) and
(2) for every abstract edge (û, v̂), all concrete nodes u where
u 7→ û must have an edge to some concrete node v where
v 7→ v̂ . Figure 8 shows an example of both a valid and invalid
∀∃−abstraction. The abstraction on the right is invalid be-
cause c does not have an edge to either a1 or a2 despite there
being an edge between b̂c and â in the abstract network.
Attribute abstraction conditions. The first conditions for
attribute abstraction, drop-equivalence and orig-equivalence,
state that the abstraction function must preserve the “no
route” and the destination attributes: h(⊥) = ⊥ and h(ad ) =
𝑎𝑏#
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Figure 7: Example abstraction for a BGP network.
âd . An abstraction must also preserve the comparison re-
lation’s attribute ordering (rank-equivalence). Finally, an
abstraction must preserve the transfer function (transfer-
equivalence), that is, applying the concrete transfer function
and abstracting the resulting attribute should be the same
as abstracting the attribute first, and then applying the ab-
stract transfer function. A critical aspect here is that, unlike
CP-equivalence, which is a network-wide property, transfer-
equivalence is a simple, local property that can be evaluated
efficiently by comparing the transfer functions.
4.2 Effectiveness implies CP Equivalence
We are now ready to prove that effective abstractions guar-
antee CP-equivalence in two steps. First, we demonstrate
that effective abstractions are label-equivalent (Figure 4). In
other words, for each solution L to SRP , there exists a cor-
responding solution L̂ to the abstract ŜRP (i.e., whenever
L labels u with a, L̂ labels f (u) with h(a)), and vice-versa.
Next, we show that given related labellings, the final control
plane behaviors are also related, i.e., they are equivalent with
respect to forwarding (fwd-equivalent as defined in Figure 4).
Our proof depends on the structure of the SRPs and their
solutions. In particular, when the SRP nodes dynamically
transmit information to one another, we would like to be able
to carry out the proof using a induction. However, we cannot
do that if the SRP solutions contain loops, as the induction
would not be well-founded. Fortunately, most broadly-used
dynamic routing protocols are loop-free by design. We will
consider the simpler case of static routes, which can be con-
figured to create loops, separately.
Theorem 4.1. Any solution L to a well-formed, loop-free
SRP will form a DAG rooted at the destination d .
Using this property of stable solutions, we can prove that
for any concrete solution L, there is an abstract solution L̂
such that the solutions are label- and fwd-equivalent (and
vice-versa). The proof goes in two steps. First, we prune the
graph to include only edges in L or L̂ that are involved in
forwarding. Within such subgraphs, we can show by induc-
tion on the length of the forwarding paths that the subgraphs
satisfy label-equivalence and fwd-equivalence. It is then easy
to come to our desired conclusion by showing that adding
the removed edges back in does not affect the stable solution
of either the concrete or the abstract graph.
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Figure 8: Topology abstraction.
Theorem 4.2. Awell-formed, loop-free SRP and its effective
abstraction ŜRP are label- and fwd-equivalent.
Using Theorem A.5, we may also conclude that any ef-
fective abstractions of common protocols, which produce
loop-free routing, are CP-equivalent. However, effectiveness
requires transfer-equivalence, which as mentioned previ-
ously commonly does not hold for BGP. That makes it im-
possible to obtain effective abstractions for BGP networks. In
the next subsection, we address this shortcoming by defining
another kind of abstraction that is applicable for BGP.
Static routing. Networks with static routes are not neces-
sarily loop-free. (The presence of a loop would clearly be
a bug, but we must be sure our theory is sound in such a
situation so we can use it to detect inadvertent bugs caused
by misconfiguration of static routes.) Fortunately, due to the
simple nature of static routing—static routes do not depend
on other routes learned from neighbors—we can prove its
correctness independently.
Theorem 4.3. A self-loop-free SRP and ŜRP for static rout-
ing with an effective abstraction will have fwd-equivalence.
4.3 BGP with Loop Prevention
We model BGP using an abstraction: h((lp, tags, path)) =
(lp, tags, f (path)). BGP’s loop-prevention is problematic here
because it depends on the actual concrete path used, which
implies that two concrete nodes x and y with syntactically
identical configurations will actually have different trans-
fer functions and violate transfer-equivalence. Node x will
reject paths that have gone through x but not y, and node
y will reject paths that have gone through y but not x . If
we were somehow able to abstract away loop prevention,
we could attempt to have topology abstractions for BGP
that are transfer-equivalent. This observation motivates the
additional properties laid out for BGP in Figure 4.
BGP-effective abstractions. For BGP, we require dest-,
drop-, orig- and rank-equivalence as for ordinary effective ab-
stractions. However, as opposed to a ∀∃−abstraction, we re-
quire a slightly stronger (forall-forall) ∀∀−abstraction. This
constraint requires that whenever there is an abstract edge
between û and v̂ if and only if there is a concrete edge be-
tween u and v . This strong condition on the network topol-
ogy allows us to get away with a weaker condition than
𝑎
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Figure 9: Abstraction refinement for Figure 2(a).
transfer-equivalence: we relax the transfer-equivalence con-
dition to what we call transfer-approx. The latter condition is
similar to transfer equivalence, except it ignores differences
caused by BGP loop-prevention. Formally, it is specified as:
∀e,a. e = (u,v) ∧v < a.path⇒
h(trans(e,a)) = trans(f (e),h(a))
Bounded behaviors. Now, given a BGP-effective abstrac-
tion, we know that, when loop-prevention happens, there
may be differences between the forwarding behaviors of dif-
ferent concrete nodes even when they have identical config-
urations. Fortunately, we can bound the number of different
behaviors that can arise dynamically, and, moreover, we can
infer that bound directly from the configurations.
First, let BL(û) be the set of possible behaviors of concrete
nodes related to abstract node û. Second, let prefs(v) be the
set of BGP local-preference values that may be assigned to
an announcement at node v . For example, if a configura-
tion explicitly sets the local-preference value to 200 or 300
depending on the route, and 100 is the default local pref-
erence, then the set prefs(v) = {100, 200, 300}. With these
definitions in hand, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. If a well-formed SRP and ŜRP for BGP has an
∀∀−abstraction and is transfer-approx, then for all solutions
L to SRP , and all abstract nodes û ∈ V̂ , |BL(û)| ≤ |prefs(û)|.
Abstraction refinement. A bound on the the number of
behaviors for nodes in BGP lets us refine an abstraction by
splitting apart abstract nodes into enough cases to recover
CP-equivalence. We now formalize this intuition.
Suppose we are given an SRP = (G,A,ad ,≺, trans) for
BGP and its abstract version ŜRP = (Ĝ, Â, âd , ≺̂, trans), which
are self-loop-free and created from a ∀∀−abstraction (f ,h).
We define a new abstraction SRP = (G,A,ad ,≺, trans) ob-
tained by splitting up each node v̂ into |prefs(v̂)| copies of
the node. We can view the mapping from SRP to ŜRP as the
composition of two abstractions (fr ,hr ) from SRP to SRP ,
and (fs ,hs ) from SRP to ŜRP , where the comparison and
transfer functions for SRP are copied from ŜRP . Given a new
abstraction (fr ,hr ) where fr : V → V and hr : A → A, we
say (fr ,hr ) refines (f ,h), written as (fr ,hr ) ⊑(fs ,hs ) (f ,h) if
fr is an onto function, and f = fs ◦ fr and h = hs ◦ hr .
We now show that there is a bisimulation between the
solutions L and L as before. However, whereas the abstrac-
tion mapping f was known in advance, the refined mapping
fr may change depending on the particular solution L. For
example, Figure 9(a) shows one of three possible forwarding
behaviors for the network. As discussed earlier, with a dif-
ferent message arrival timing, other solutions would have
emerged. Depending upon this solution, different nodes, e.g.
{b1,b2} or {b1,b3} would be mapped to bn . We do not know
which concrete nodes are mapped to which abstract nodes,
but we do know that the abstraction has sufficiently many
nodes to characterize all possible behaviors.
Theorem 4.5. Suppose we have well-formed SRP , ŜRP , and
SRP for BGP with an effective abstraction (f ,h). There is a
solution L to SRP iff there is a solution L to SRP , such that
there exists a refinement (fr ,hr ) ⊑(fs ,hs ) (f ,h) and L and L
are label- and fwd-equivalent.
A key difference between Theorem A.5 and Theorem A.8,
is that the forwarding paths between the concrete network
(SRP ) and the refined network (SRP ) will only be equiva-
lent with respect to the original abstract network (ŜRP ). For
example, in Figure 9(a), if we want to check that b2 and b3
forward along a path that satisfies some property p, then we
can not check it against only ba in Figure 9(b). Rather, we
have to check it against bn as well because there is another
stable solution where the roles of ba and bn are reversed.
4.4 Properties preserved
As a consequence of CP-equivalence, for a solution L to the
concrete network, there exists a path s = x1, . . . ,xk where
the network forwards along s with labels L(x1), . . . ,L(xk )
iff for some solution L̂ to the abstract network, there is a path
f (s) where the abstract network forwards along f (s) with
labels L̂(f (x1)), . . . , L̂(f (xk )). Concretely, one can check
that any of the following properties hold on small abstract
networks and be sure the concrete counterpart satisfies the
property as well.
• Reachability: f (u) can reach f (v) in the abstract network
iff u can reach v in the concrete network.
• PathLength:All paths between f (u) and f (v) have length
n iff all paths between u and v have length n.
• Black Holes: Path s in the concrete network ends with
label ⊥ iff path f (s) ends with ⊥ in the abstract network.
• Multipath Consistency: Traffic sent from f (u) is reach-
able along some path to f (v) but dropped along another
path iff traffic from u is reachable along some path to v
and dropped along another path.
• Waypointing: Traffic will be waypointed through one of
{ f (w1), . . . , f (wn)} in the abstract network iff it will go
through one of {w1, . . . ,wn} in the concrete network.
• Routing Loops: There is a routing loop in the abstract
network iff there is one in the concrete network.
Convergence. The concrete network necessarily diverges
(has no stable solution) iff the abstract network necessarily
diverges. To see why, suppose the concrete network had no
stable solution, but the abstract network had a stable solu-
tion. This would violate CP-equivalence, since each abstract
solution has a corresponding concrete solution. Similarly, the
concrete network can converge (has some stable solution) iff
the abstract network can converge. However, CP-equivalence
alone does not guarantee that networks that might converge
or might diverge, like the naughty gadget in BGP [21], will
necessarily reduce to an abstract network that may diverge.
On the other hand, effective abstractions are stronger than
(imply) CP-equivalence. We postulate (but have not proven)
that an effective abstraction is sufficient to preserve con-
vergence. For example, it would appear that the concrete
network will have a dispute wheel [21] (the lack of which
is sufficient condition for convergence safety and robust-
ness) iff the abstract network has a dispute wheel (the nodes
in concrete network forming a dispute wheel will induce a
dispute wheel in their abstract counterpart).
4.5 Properties not preserved
While effective abstractions preserve the nature of forward-
ing paths, they do not, in general, preserve the number of
paths or the number of neighbors. Indeed, that is the point—
effective abstractions usually reduce the number of paths and
neighbors to speed analysis. Consequently, we cannot rea-
son faithfully about properties such as fault tolerance, load
balancing, or any QoS properties. For instance, in the ab-
stract network, a single link failure may partition a network
whereas in the concrete network, there may exist two or
more link-disjoint paths between all pairs of nodes, allowing
the concrete network to tolerate any single failure.
5 ABSTRACTION ALGORITHM
Earlier sections described the conditions under which an
abstraction will preserve CP-equivalence, but they give no
insight into how one might compute such an abstraction.
In this section, we describe an algorithm that computes an
abstraction directly from a set of router configurations.
5.1 Algorithm Overview
Our algorithm starts with the following observations. The
key requirement for computing an effective abstraction is to
ensure that we satisfy each required condition in Figure 4.
ip community-list dept permit 65001:1
ip community-list dept permit 65001:2
route-map M 10 
match community dept 
set community 65001:3 additive 
set local-preference 350
𝑐"𝑐#′ 𝑐%lp"′
lp#%′1
…
0
Figure 10: BDD for a BGP policy on an interface.
Some conditions such as orig-equivalence (h(ad ) = âd ), drop-
equivalence (h(a) = ⊥ ⇐⇒ a = ⊥) and rank-equivalence
(a ≺ b ⇐⇒ h(a) ≺̂ h(b)) depend only on the particular
protocol and choice of h. By fixing h in advance for each
protocol similar to those used in Figures 5 and 6, we can
guarantee that these conditions hold regardless of the con-
figurations. Other conditions such as dest-equivalence and
∀∃−abstraction depend on the topology, but not the policy
embedded in configurations.
Transfer-equivalence: h(trans(e,a)) = trans(f (e),h(a)) is
the only condition that depends on user-defined policy. Sup-
pose two concrete edges e1 and e2 are mapped together by
the topology function f . We would have h(trans(e1,a)) =trans(f (e1),h(a)) = trans(f (e2),h(a)) = h(trans(e2,a)). One
simple way to ensure that this equality holds is to only com-
bine together nodes with the same transfer function. In our
example, trans(e1,a) = trans(e2,a) would suffice to allow e1
and e2 to map to the same abstract edge.
Based on the observations above, we fix h; our remaining
task is to find a suitable f that satisfies the topology abstrac-
tion requirements and only maps together edges with equiv-
alent transfer functions (for the destination d). We find such
a function f using an algorithm based on abstraction refine-
ment. We start with the coarsest possible abstraction where
there is a single abstract destination node d̂ and one other
abstract node for all other concrete nodes, and while the
abstraction violates ∀∃−abstraction or transfer-equivalence,
we refine it by breaking up the problematic abstract node
into multiple abstract nodes.
For efficiency, before abstraction refinement, we process
router configurations in two different ways.
1. Destination Equivalence Classes (ECs). In our theoret-
ical account of routing, each SRP contains a single destina-
tion. However, in practice, configurations contain routing
information for many destinations simultaneously. Because
announcements for (most) destinations do not interact with
one another, we can partition the network into equivalence
classes based on where destinations are rooted. Each class
has a collection of destination IP ranges and destination
node(s). This partitioning allows us to build one abstraction
per class instead of one per address. To partition the network
Algorithm 1 Compute abstraction function f
1: procedure FindAbstraction(Graph G, Bdds bdds)
2: Specialize(bdds, G.d)
3: f← UnionSplitFind(G.V)
4: Split(f, {G .d })
5: while True do
6: V̂ ← Partitions(f)
7: for û in V̂ do
8: if |û | ≤ 1 then continue
9: Refine(G, bdds, f, û , |prefs(û) |)
10: V̂ ′ ← Partitions(f)
11: if |V̂ | = |V̂ ′ | then break
12: return SplitIntoBGPCases(f)
13:
14: procedure Refine(G, bdds, f, û , numPrefs)
15: map← CreateMap
16: for u ∈ û do
17: for e = (u, v) ∈ G.E do
18: pol← Get(bdds, e)
19: n← (numPrefs > 1 ? v : f (v))
20: map[u]← map[u] ∪ { (pol, n) }
21: for us ∈ GroupKeysByValue(map) do
22: Split(f,us)
into equivalence classes, we use a prefix-trie data structure
where the leaves of the trie contain a set of destination nodes.
2. Encoding transfer function using BDDs. In order to
efficiently find all interfaces that have equivalent transfer-
functions for a given destination (class), we use Binary Deci-
sion Diagrams (BDDs) [8] to represent the routing policy for
each interface. BDDs can compactly represent Boolean func-
tions and are a canonical representation for such functions.
Memoization combined with uniqueness of the representa-
tion means that two BDDs are semantically-equivalent iff
their pointers are the same. This turns checking equivalence
of any two transfer functions into an O(1) operation after
their BDDs are constructed.
As an example, consider the BGP routing policy in Fig-
ure 10. The policy checks if either the 65001:1 or 65001:2
community is attached to an inbound route advertisement. If
so, it adds the 65001:3 community and updates the local pref-
erence to 350. Each node in the BDD represents a boolean
variable used to represent state in the advertisement. Primed
variables represent output values after applying updates to
the advertisement. A solid arrow means the value is true,
while a dashed arrow means the value is false. There are
two leaf values: 0 and 1 which represent false and true, re-
spectively. Any path from the BDD root to 1 represents a
valid input-output relation. If c1, the variable representing
community 65001:1 is true, then the resulting advertisement
will have c ′3 true (65001:3 attached), and will have a local
preference for the 32 bit value representation of 350.
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Figure 11: Abstractions for a network running BGP on
a fattree topology using different policies.
5.2 The Algorithm
Algorithm 1 lists the steps used to compute the abstraction
function f given graph (G) and a collection of BDDs (bdds).
The first step is to specialize the bdds to the particular desti-
nation G .d (line 2). We use a union-split-find data structure
to maintain a collection of disjoint sets of concrete nodes
that represent the abstract nodes in the network. One of the
first steps is to split the collection of sets so thatG .d becomes
its own abstract node (line 4) and every other concrete node
remains as a single other abstract node. Next, it repeatedly
tries to refine the abstraction while it is not a effective ab-
straction. The algorithm iterates over each current abstract
node (set of concrete nodes). If the abstract node is already
fully concrete (line 8), then it continues, otherwise it refines
the abstraction. Refine iterates over each concrete node u in
the abstract node û and each edge from u to v , and builds a
map from u to a set of pairs of the BDD policy along edge
(u,v) and the neighboring node (line 20)—either the con-
crete neighbor (for ∀∀−abstraction) or the abstract neighbor
(for ∀∃−abstraction). Finally, we group entries of the map
(us) by those values that have the same pairs of policies and
neighbors, and then refine the abstraction by these groups
(line 22). This step ensures that groups of devices that have
different transfer functions or policies to different neighbors
are separated in the next iteration of the algorithm.
Figure 11 shows the output of the algorithm on a BGP-
based fattree network with two different routing policies. In
one case, the network uses shortest (AS) path routing, and in
the second case, the middle-tier of routers prefer to route via
the bottom tier. The abstract network is bigger in the second
case to capture the greater number of possible forwarding
behaviors of the middle-tier routers.
6 PRACTICAL EXTENSIONS
Multiple Protocols. Although the stable routing problem
is framed in terms of the behavior of a particular protocol,
devices in practice often run multiple protocols at once. One
can build a new SRP to model these interactions. For exam-
ple, if a network runs both OSPF and eBGP, then the SRP
Topology Nodes / Edges Abs. Nodes / Edges Compression ratio Num ECs BDD time Compression time (per EC)
(a) Synthetic networks
Fattree
180 / 2124 6 / 5 30× / 424.8× 72 0.36 0.09
500 / 9100 6 / 5 83.33× / 1820× 200 1.29 0.26
1125 / 29475 6 / 5 187.5× / 5895× 450 7.87 0.75
Ring
100 / 100 51 / 50 1.96× / 2× 100 0.14 0.08
500 / 500 251 / 250 1.99× / 2× 500 0.33 2.29
1000 / 1000 501 / 500 2× / 2× 1000 0.34 12.26
Full Mesh
50 / 1225 2 / 1 25× / 1225× 50 0.18 0.07
150 / 4950 2 / 1 75× / 4950× 150 1.11 0.34
250 / 31125 2 / 1 125× / 31125× 250 3.31 5.48
(b) Real networks
Data center 197 / 16091 30.2 ± 2.2 / 143.6 ± 18.6 6.6× / 112× 1269 132.28 15.51
WAN 1086 / 5430 209.4 ± 36.5 / 759.4 ± 129.2 5.2× / 7.2× 845 11.35 1.83
Table 1: Compression results for synthetic and real networks. All times are in seconds.
could use attributes of the form A = ABGP ×AOSPF ×ARIB .
That is, track both OSPF and BGP, as well as ARIB , which
represents the main RIB that carries the best route (based
on administrative distance) between the various protocols
and records what protocol was chosen. Following ideas from
Batfish [18], we model route redistribution, where routes
from one protocol are injected into another, via the transfer
function. For instance, if OSPF routes are redistributed into
BGP, then BGP will allow routes from ARIB even when they
are from OSPF.
Access Control Lists. While ACLs do not affect control
plane routing information, they can prevent traffic from
being forwarded out an interface. For this reason, we conser-
vatively consider the ACL to be part of the transfer function,
which gets captured in the BDD, so that nodes will only
be abstracted together if they have the same ACLs with re-
spect to destination d . This ensures that the fwd-equivalence
property will remain valid.
iBGP. iBGP is a complicated protocol that recursively routes
packets for eBGP by communicating them over an IGP path.
If there is a valid abstraction for both the IGP and for eBGP,
and there is noACL in the network that blocks iBGP loopback
addresses, then multiple iBGP neighbors can be compressed
together. This is because (1) both iBGP neighbors will be sent
the same eBGP routes from neighbors, (2) these advertise-
ments will have the same IGP cost metric (since they must be
symmetric with respect to the IGP as well), and (3) although
the iBGP neighbors may have an edge between them, poten-
tially violating the self-loop-free requirement, this edge is
never used since iBGP does not re-advertise routes learned
over iBGP to other iBGP neighbors.
7 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented our network abstraction algorithm in a
tool called Bonsai. It uses the Batfish [18] network analysis
framework to convert network configurations into a vendor-
independent intermediate representation. Bonsai operates
over this vendor-independent format to create a network
abstraction in the form of a smaller, simpler collection of
vendor-independent configurations. Tools built using this
framework, such as Batfish and Minesweeper, can then work
with the smaller configurations to speed up their analysis.
We use the Javabdd [42] library to encode router-level im-
port and export filters, as well as access control lists (ACLs) as
BDDs. Because Bonsai creates abstract networks per destina-
tion EC, and such ECs are disjoint,our implementation is able
to generate abstract networks and check their properties in
parallel. We only generate abstract networks for destination
ECs that are relevant for a query. For example, checking port-
to-port reachability would typically only require generating
a single abstract network for one EC.
8 EVALUATION
We evaluate Bonsai using a collection of synthetic and real
networks. We aim to answer the following questions: (i)
can Bonsai scale to large networks? (ii) can its algorithm
effectively compress networks? and (iii) can the abstract,
compressed networks be speed network analysis?
Networks studied.We study three types of synthetic net-
work topologies: Fattree [1], Ring, and Full-mesh. Each such
network uses eBGP to perform shortest path routing along
with destination-based prefix filters to each destination. These
networks are highly symmetric by design and are used to
characterize compression as a function of network topol-
ogy and size. For each topology type, we scale the size and
measure the effectiveness and cost of compression.
While the synthetic networks focus on the effect of topol-
ogy on compression, in practice, most networks do not have
perfect symmetry. For this reason, we study operational net-
works of two different corporations. The first is a datacenter
(a) Fattree (b) Full Mesh (c) Ring
Figure 12: Minesweeper (MS) verification time with and without abstraction for an all-pairs reachability query.
network with 197 routers organized into multiple clusters,
each with a Clos-like topology (rather than a single, large
Clos-like topology). The network primarily uses eBGP and
static routing, with each router running as its own AS using
BGP private AS numbers. It also makes extensive use of route
filters, ACLs, and BGP communities. All together, it has over
540,000 lines of configuration. Although there are less than
200 routers in the network, there are over 16,000 physical
and virtual interfaces in the network.
The second operational network is a wide-area network
(WAN) with 1086 devices, which are a mix of routers and
switches. The network uses a eBGP, iBGP, OSPF, and static
routing, and consists of over 600,000 lines of configuration.
Synthetic network results. Table 1(a) shows the results of
running Bonsai on the synthetic networks. All experiments
were run on an a 8-core Macbook Pro with an Intel i7 pro-
cessor and 8GB of RAM. For each synthetic network, Bonsai
is able to compress the network quickly. For instance, the
largest Fattree topology with 1125 nodes takes around 7.9
seconds to build the BDD data structures and an average
of of .75 seconds per EC to compute the abstract network
for the 450 ECs. Because equivalence classes are processed
in parallel, it takes under a minute to abstract this network.
The compressed network size computed is 6 nodes.
For the Fattree and Full-mesh topologies, the compressed
network size stays constant as the concrete network grows.
For the ring topology, the compressed network size does
grow with the size of the network, and in particular, grows
with the diameter of the network. This is necessary since
the abstraction must preserve path length. Computing an
abstraction for the ring topologies is more expensive because
the compression algorithm is only able to split out a single
new abstract role with each iteration.
Bonsai’s compression has a large effect on network analy-
sis time. Figure 12 shows the total verification time to check
an all-pairs reachability query compared to topology size for
each type of synthetic network using Minesweeper [5]. We
use a timeout of 10 minutes. The verification time for abstract
networks includes the time used to partition the network,
build the BDDs, and compute the compressed network. In all
cases, abstraction significantly speeds up verification even
when taking into account the time to run Bonsai. Abstracting
the Full-mesh topology ran out of memory beyond a certain
point, due to the density of the topology.
Real network results. For both networks, we first com-
puted the BDDs and see how many devices have identi-
cal transfer functions from their configurations. In the dat-
acenter network, we initially found that there were 112
unique "roles" (set of policies) among the 197 routers. How-
ever, many of these differences could be attributed to BGP
community values that were attached to routers, but then
never matched on in any configuration file. To account for
these differences, we use the abstraction function for BGP:
h(lp, tags, path) = (lp, tags − {unused}, f (path)), which ig-
nores differences from such irrelevant tags. With this abstrac-
tion function, we find that there are only 26 unique "roles"
among the 197 routers. Further, most of the differences are
due to differences in static routes in the configurations. With-
out static routes, there would only be 8 unique roles. Table 1
(b) shows the compression results from this network. It takes
just over 2 minutes to compute the BDDs and roughly 15 sec-
onds on average to compute a good abstraction per EC. This
time is mainly due to the huge number of virtual interfaces.
The average compressed network size is around 30 nodes (a
6.6x reduction), and around 132 edges (a 112x reduction).
For theWAN, we found 137 unique "roles" among the 1086
devices. Many of the differences are from neighbor-specific,
prefix-based filters and ACLs. It takes around 11 seconds to
compute the BDDs for the network, and under 2 seconds per
EC to compute a good abstraction. The average compressed
size achieves a 5.2x reduction in the number of nodes and a
7.4x reduction in the number of edges.
Finally, to test the effectiveness of Bonsai at facilitating
scalable analysis of real networks, we run a reachability
query between two devices in Batfish, both with and with-
out abstraction. Batfish first simulates the control plane to
produce the data plane and then uses NoD [31] to compute
all possible packets that can traverse between source and
destination nodes. With Bonsai, it takes 77 seconds to com-
plete the query. Without it, the query did not complete and
gave an out-of-memory error after running for over an hour.
9 RELATEDWORK
Network verification. The field of network verification
may be split into data plane verification [7, 24–26, 28, 31,
33, 43] and control plane verification [5, 14, 15, 18, 19, 41],
with our work sitting in the latter camp. However, Bonsai
is orthogonal to, and synergistic with, most of this reseach
as it compresses networks and leaves the analysis to other
tools, which typically operate much more quickly over the
compressed network. Bonsai works because large networks
typically contain symmetries, an observation made and ex-
ploited Plotkin et al. [35], though Plotkin et al. focus on
data plane properties whereas we focus on control plane
properties. The only other control plane compression work
we are aware focuses on compressing BGP networks using
local rewrites to preserve convergence properties [40]. In
contrast, we introduce the SRP model to compress networks
running a wide-variety of protocols using both local and
some non-local (BGP splitting) rewrites. We aim to preserve
forwarding properties so network administrators can test for
reachability, access control and other path-based properties
rather than convergence.
Control plane models. A formal model of network con-
trol plane planes lies at the heart of our work. Many prior
works have developed such models to describe formally the
computation of routing protocols, their safety criteria, or to
generalize their computation [21, 22, 37]. Our model, SRP, is
inspired by Griffin et al.’s stable paths problem (SPP) which
described control plane solutions computed by path vector
protocols [21]. While both models describe stable solutions,
SRP formalizes device-level processing of routing informa-
tion instead of end-to-end paths. This difference allows it to
capture a broader range of control plane features.
SRPs are similar to routing algebras [22, 37], though we
have simplified our presentation slightly by allowing graph
edges to stand in for the labels used in routing algebras. How-
ever, themore significant difference is that while routing alge-
bras have been used to study convergence properties, which
are independent of network topology, we study topology-
dependent properties such as reachability, and developed
compression algorithms that preserve such properties.
Abstractions in verification. Conservative abstractions
are the mainstay of program verification in various forms
such as loop invariants [17, 23], abstract interpretation [12],
and counterexample guided abstraction refinement [3, 10, 11].
These abstractions enable sound analysis for verification
problems that are often undecidable or intractable. Tighter
abstractions based on symmetry and bisimulations have also
been used successfully to scale model checking [9, 13]. We
build on these foundations to seek useful abstractions for
compressing networks that preserve CP-equivalence.
10 CONCLUSION
Recently, researchers have made great progress in control
plane analysis, using a variety of techniques ranging from
simulation to verification. But the scale and complexity of
real networks often renders such techniques computation-
ally expensive or even intractable. To accelerate analysis, our
Bonsai tool automatically compresses a network and its con-
figurations by eliminating any structural symmetries. Bonsai
is based on a theory of control plane equivalence of two
networks and an efficient compression algorithm. We show
that it scales well and effectively compresses real networks.
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A PROOF OF CP-EQUIVALENCE
Here we give the full proof of CP-equivalence from Section 4.2. The proof requires additional lemmas and definitions not
introduced in Section 4.2. First, we make an observation about attribute equality (≈).
Theorem A.1. Given an effective abstraction, ∀a,b . a ≈ b ⇐⇒ h(a) ≈ h(b)
Proof. Immediate from rank-equivalence. Suppose a ≈ b. Then a ⊀ b ∧ b ⊀ a. From rank-equivalence, this means that
h(a) ⊀ h(b) ∧ h(b) ⊀ h(a), and thus h(a) ≈ h(b). The reverse holds by the same reasoning. □
Next, we define choice-equivalence, which states that nodes in the abstract and concrete networks receive similar types of
choices from similar neighbors:
Definition A.1. We say that an abstraction (f ,h) is choice-equivalent if the following holds:
1. ∀e,a. (e,a) ∈ choicesL(u) =⇒ (f (e),h(a)) ∈ choicesL(f (u))
2. ∀E,A. (E,A) ∈ choicesL(f (u)) =⇒ ∀e 7→ E, ∃a. a 7→ A ∧ (e,a) ∈ choicesL(u)
Theorem A.2. If we have a self-loop-free SRP and ŜRP , and a effective abstraction that is choice-equivalent, then the abstraction
is label-equivalent.
Proof. Looking at the definition of L, there are 3 cases to consider. First we observe that ifv = d , then L(d) = ad . It follows
that L̂(f (d)) = L̂(d̂) = âd = h(ad ) = h(L(d)). In the second case, using choice-equivalence and ∀∃−abstraction, we can see
that attrsL(v) = ∅ ⇐⇒ attrsL(f (v)) = ∅. Thus, h(L(v)) = h(⊥) = ⊥ = L̂(f (v)). For the final case with attrsL(v) , ∅, we
show the implications separately.
Case (⇒) Assume L(v) = a. By the definition of L, we know that a ∈ attrsL(v) and is minimal by ≺. We know that there is
some edge e such that (e,a) ∈ choicesL(v). Consider all concrete edges (e ′,a′) ∈ choicesL(v). From choice-equivalence, we
know that (f (e ′),h(a′)) ∈ choicesL(f (v)) for each such pair. From rank-equivalence, we know (f (e),h(a)) ∈ choicesL(f (v))
and is minimal by ≺̂. By the definition of L, we then know that L̂(f (v)) = A = h(a). By transitivity, L̂(f (v)) = h(L(v))
Case (⇐) Assume L̂(f (v)) = A. We know thatA ∈ attrsL(f (v)) and is minimal by ≺̂. Assume (E,A) ∈ choices(f (v)). Consider
all such (E ′,A′) ∈ choicesL(f (v)). From choice-equivalence, we know that for any concrete edge e 7→ E, there exists a
such that h(a) = A and (e,a) ∈ choices(v). Therefore, a ∈ attrsL(v). Let us consider a smallest such a in terms of ≺. From
rank-equivalence, we know that a is smaller than any (e ′,a′) where f (e ′) , f (e) sinceAwas the smallest such value in choices .
Therefore, a ∈ attrs(v) and is minimal by ≺. Finally, we obtain that the labeling can be a (L(v) = a). It follows from transitivity
that h(L(v)) = L̂(f (v)). □
Theorem A.3. If we have a self-loop-free SRP and ŜRP and a effective abstraction that is choice-equivalent, then the abstraction
is fwd-equivalent.
Proof. From Theorem A.2, we know that we have label-equivalence.
Case 1We assume e = (u,v) ∈ fwdL(u) and need to show that f (e) ∈ f̂wdL̂(f (u)). By the definition of fwdL , we know that∃a.(e,a) ∈ choicesL(u) ∧ a ≈ L(u). From choice-equivalence, this means that
(f (e),h(a)) ∈ choicesL(f (u))
Thus, because we have choice-equivalence, we have label-equivalence. Recall from label equivalence: h(L(u)) = L̂(f (u)). From
Theorem A.1, we have a ≈ L(u) so h(a) ≈ h(L(u)) and thus h(a) ≈ L̂(f (u)). Then, by the definition of f̂wdL̂ :
f (e) ∈ fwdL(f (u))
Case 2 We will assume (û, v̂) ∈ fwdL(û) and show that for all concrete nodes u 7→ û, there exists a v 7→ v̂ such that
(u,v) ∈ fwdL(u). By the definition of fwdL , we know that: ∃A. ((û, v̂),A) ∈ choicesL(û) ∧ L̂(û) ≈ A. From choice-equivalence,
this means:
∀e 7→ E, ∃a. h(a) = A ∧ (e,a) ∈ choicesL(u) ∧ L̂(û) ≈ A
Consider any such e = (u,v) where f (e) = E. Rewriting slightly, we get:
∃a. (e,a) ∈ choicesL(u) ∧ L̂(f (u)) ≈ h(a)
Once again, from Theorem A.1 and transfer-equivalence, we know that L̂(f (u)) = h(L(u)) and so h(a) ≈ h(L(u)), and
therefore: a ≈ L(u). Finally, from the definition of fwdL we have
e ∈ fwdL(u)
.
□
Theorem A.4. The forwarding behavior for any solution L to a well-formed, loop-free SRP will form a DAG rooted at the
destination d .
Proof. We know that the solution is loop-free so the result must not have cycles. Also, there can only be one root for the
DAG (d) because if there were another d ′, then L(d ′) = ⊥, otherwise d ′ would forward to some neighbor. However, because
the SRP is non-spontaneous, this can not happen. □
Theorem A.5. A well-formed, loop-free SRP and its effective abstraction ŜRP are label- and fwd-equivalent. That is, for any L
there exists label and fwd-equivalent L̂ and vice-versa.
Proof. It suffices to first show choice-equivalence. We then get label-equivalence for free from Theorem A.2, and then that
SRP and ŜRP are fwd-equivalent from Theorem A.3.
Because we know the SRP is loop-free and non-spontaneous, we know that any stable solution L (and L̂) must form a
rooted DAG at the destination d (Theorem A.4). We start by showing a slightly strengthened inductive hypothesis: with the
choice-equivalence property above for the subgraph corresponding to the actual forwarding edges in the provided concrete (or
abstract) solution L (or L̂). That is, given a concrete solution L we will only consider edges e = (u,v) where e goes from
level k + 1 to level k in the DAG, and similarly for the abstract network, we will only consider the corresponding edges f (e).
Symmetrically, for the other direction, we will only consider abstract edges eˆ = (û, v̂) going from level k + 1 to level k and only
the edges e where f (e) = ê for the concrete network. For both directions, we will show label-equivalence (h(L(v)) = L̂(f (v)))
holds at each node. We show each direction of the stronger implication separately, using induction on the level of the DAG.
Base case (for ⇒ and ⇐): For the base case, from the definition of L, we know that L(d) = ad and L̂(d̂) = âd . From
dest-equivalence, we know that f (d) = d̂ , so:
L̂(f (d)) = L̂(d̂) = âd = h(ad ) = h(L(d))
Since there are no edges e going to a lower level in the DAG (than the root) in either the concrete or abstract, we are done.
Inductive case (⇒)We are givenL and show that there exists a L̂ for the subgraph we have induced that has label-equivalence.
Consider an arbitrary node u at depth k . Now, suppose (e,a) ∈ choicesL(u) and e = (u,v). We know that v appears at level
k − 1 in the DAG. We also know that a = trans(e,L(v)) , ⊥. Since a , ⊥, from drop-equiv, we know that h(a) , bot . By the
IH with label-equivalence, we know that L̂(f (v)) = h(L(v)). From transfer-equivalence, we know thattrans(f (e),h(L(v))) = h(trans(e,L(v))) = h(a) , ⊥
By transitivity and label-equivalence (IH) then, we know:trans(f (e), L̂(f (v))) = h(a)
By the definition of choicesL , it follows that
(f (e),h(a)) ∈ choicesL(f (u))
Hence, we have choice-equivalence. This means that the set of choices available at f (u) from f (v) is “the same” as the set of
choices available at u from v . Since we have choice-equivalence, it follows that we have label-equivalence and fwd-equivalence
for the subgraph under consideration.
Inductive case (⇐) We are given L̂ and show that there exists a L for the induced subgraph that has label-equivalence.
Consider an arbitrary node û at depth k of the abstract subgraph. Now, suppose (E,A) ∈ choicesL(û) and E = (û, v̂). From the
∀∃−abstraction and the fact that f is onto, we know there must be at least some e such that f (e) = E = (f (u), f (v)) (otherwise
E could not have been an abstract edge). Consider an arbitrary such e = (u,v). We know that v̂ appears at level k − 1 in the
DAG (and so does v by construction). We also know that A = trans(f (e), L̂(f (v)) , ⊥. From drop-equiv, we know that any a
where h(a) = A and A , ⊥ has a , ⊥. As before, we observe by the IH that L̂(f (v)) = h(L(v)). And so:
A = trans(f (e),h(L(v))) = h(trans(e,L(v))) , ⊥
Let a stand for trans(e,L(v)). Then a = trans(e,L(v)) and h(a) = A. By the definition of choicesL , it follows that:
∃a. h(a) = A ∧ (e,a) ∈ choicesL(u)
Because we showed choice equivalence for any such edge e from any node u 7→ û, we have choice-equivalence. This implies
that we also have label- and fwd-equivalence.
Other edges All that remains is to show that edges going to a equal or higher level of the DAG do not change the existing
solution. Suppose we were given the concrete network. Consider such an edge ê = (û, v̂). For this edge to affect the current
solution L̂, it must be the case that for some ê ′ and v̂ ′:trans(̂e, L̂(v̂)) ≺̂ L̂(û) = trans(̂e ′, L̂(v̂ ′))
Rewriting slightly: trans(̂e,h(L(v))) ≺̂ trans(̂e ′,h(L(v ′))))
From transfer equivalence:
h(trans(e,L(v))) ≺ h(trans(e ′,L(v ′)))
From rank-equivalence:
trans(e,L(v)) ≺ trans(e ′,L(v ′))
Given the definition of L, this leads to a contradiction with the fact that the concrete solution was indeed stable. In particular,
node u has a better option through v ′ over v , and hence, the labelling is incorrect. We can conclude then, that here can be no
such better option in the abstract network. The argument is symmetric for the other direction. □
Using Theorem A.5, we may conclude that any effective abstractions of common protocols, which produce loop-free routing,
are CP-equivalent. Now we show that static routing, which is not necessarily loop-free, also has this property.
Theorem A.6. Given self-loop-free SRP and ŜRP for static routing with an effective abstraction, then it is fwd-equivalent.
Proof. Because the labeling at each node does not depend on the labeling at other nodes, the proof is direct. As before, we
show choice-equivalence, then rely on A.3 to derive CP-equivalence.
Case (⇒) Assume e = (u,v). We have (e,a) ∈ choicesL(u). By unfolding the definition of choicesL , we know that a =
trans(e,L(v)). By transfer equivalence, we know that
h(a) = h(trans(e,L(v))) = trans(f (e),h(L(v)))
There are now 2 cases. Suppose a = 1. Then h(a) = 1, sotrans(f (e),h(L(v))) = 1
The definition of trans does not depend on the attribute for static routes, we know that :trans(f (e), L̂(v)) = 1
It follows that (f (e), 1) ∈ choices(f (u))
The case for a = 0, is symmetric, with (f (e), 0) ∈ choices(f (u)).
Figure 13: A stable solution with the maximum number of behaviors.
Case (⇐) Suppose ((û, v̂),A) ∈ choicesL(û). We need to show that for any edge e 7→ E, there exists an a such that (e,a) ∈
choicesL(u) and h(a) = A. Let us choose a = A for static routes. Clearly h(a) = A since h is the identity. Consider arbitrary
edge e 7→ E. We have: trans(f (e), L̂(f (v)))) = A = h(a) = a
Again, since the definition of trans does not depend on the neighbor attribute, we can replace it with any value. In particular,
this is the same as:
a = trans(f (e),h(L(v)))
From transfer-equivalence and transitivity we know that:
a = trans(e,L(v))
Finally, from the definition of choicesL : ∃a. h(a) = A ∧ (e,a) ∈ choicesL(u) □
Corollary A.1. Suppose we have a self-loop-free SRP and ŜRP for RIP, OSPF, static routing, or BGP (without loop prevention),
related by effective abstraction (f ,h). There is a solutionL, where each nodeu1 7→ û1 forwards along label path s = L(u1) . . .L(uk )
to some node uk 7→ ûk iff there is a solution L̂ that forwards along the label path ŝ = L(û1) . . .L(ûk ) and h(s) = ŝ .
Proof. We show each direction separately.
Case (⇒) Suppose L is a solution for SRP . Given any two nodes u and v where u can reach v , there exists a path p =
u,w1, . . . ,wk ,v where (u,w1) ∈ fwdL(u) and (wi ,wi+1) ∈ fwdL(wi ) and (wk ,v) ∈ fwdL(wk ). Because L and L̂ are
fwd-equivalent, we know that (f (u), f (w1)) ∈ f̂wdL̂(f (u)) and so on. Therefore, there is an abstract path in L̂ where
f (u) can reach f (v) where the path has the form f (u), f (w1), . . . , f (wk ), f (v). The labels of the concrete path are s =
L(u),L(w1), . . . ,L(wk ),L(v). Similarly, the abstract path has labels L̂(f (u)), . . . , L̂(f (v)). It follows from label-equivalence
that L̂(f (u)), . . . , L̂(f (v)) = h(L(u)), . . . ,h(L(v)). Finally, the definition of h gives us: h(L(u)), . . . ,h(L(v)) = h(s)
Case (⇐) Symmetric to the first case. Suppose L̂ is a solution for ŜRP . Consider an arbitrary path û, ŵ1, . . . , ŵk , v̂ . Then we
know (û, ŵ1) ∈ fwdL(û) and so on. From the fact that L and L̂ are fwd-equivalent, every node u where u 7→ û will follow
some path (u,w1) ∈ f wd(u) and so on. Therefore, there will be a concrete path u,w1, . . . ,wk ,v such thatwi 7→ ŵi , and v 7→ v̂ .
The abstract path ŝ = L̂(û), . . . , L̂(v̂). Similarly, the concrete path will have s = L(u), . . . ,L(v). To show that ŝ = h(s), we
simply use label-equivalence: h(s) = h(L(u)), . . . ,h(L(v)) = ŝ .
□
Theorem A.7. If a well-formed SRP and ŜRP for BGP has an ∀∀−abstraction and is transfer-approx, then for all solutions L
to SRP , and all abstract nodes û ∈ V̂ , |BL(û)| ≤ |prefs(û)|.
Proof. Because we have rank-equivalence and an ∀∀−abstraction, the only way two nodes will forward to different
neighbors is the transfer functions are different. Otherwise, both nodes would receive the same choicesL as in Theorem A.5
and because of the universal abstraction, they both have an edge to the best such choice and will use this neighbor. Due to
relative-transfer-equivalence, the only time this can occur is when two nodes have different transfer functions due to loop
prevention.
First we show that there can be |prefs(û)| different behaviors. Consider Figure 13. In the figure, û has a local preference
for v̂1 over v̂2 over v̂3 etc. In this case, |prefs(û)| = 3. There is a stable solution where u1 forwards to v11 since that is the
best path. u2 would prefer to use this path, but cannot because it is already on the path, so it cannot consider v11 due to its
transfer function. Instead, u2 will use the next best choice v21. Similarly, u3 would like to use v11 or v21 but cannot due to
loops. Therefore, u3 will forward to v31 instead. Because there is a universal abstraction (full mesh), and because we have
rank-equivalence and relative-transfer-equivalence, each node has the same choices modulo loops. Such a chain as shown in
Figure 13 is the only way we can get such different behavior.
Now we show that there can not be more than |prefs(û)| behaviors. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose we have another
node u4 and u4 will forward to a different node that each of u1 through u3. u4 can not continue the chain by falling back to
the next lowest local preference since all local preferences have been exhausted by u1 through u3. Therefore, u4 will forward
to one of the same neighbors as u1 through u3. But this contradicts the assumption. Therefore, there can not be more than
|prefs(û)| behaviors.
□
Theorem A.8. Suppose we have well-formed SRP , ŜRP , and SRP for BGP with an effective abstraction (f ,h). For any solution L
to SRP , there exists a refinement (fr ,hr ) ⊑(fs ,hs ) (f ,h) where L is a solution to SRP , and L and L are label- and fwd-equivalent.
Proof. First, we will show a particular refinement. From Theorem A.7, we know that any solution to L can only have
|prefs(v̂)| behaviors. Let use define fr (v) = v = behavior(f (v))(i), where this notation means that we pick out the ith node in
V such that fs maps it to v̂ . We can modify this scheme slightly to ensure that fr is an onto function, if no node would map to
the kth behavior, then pick an arbitrary node that maps to the jth behavior (if there is more than one node that maps to the jth
behavior), and map it to the kth behavior instead. This is a valid refinement to (f ,h) since f = fs ◦ fr and fr is onto.
Since we have a particular solution L that is loop-free (since BGP is loop-free), we know all the edges in SRP that are not
used due to loops. For example, in Figure 9 in the concrete network (left), the green node would have transfer function ⊥ from
each of the red neighbors below due to loop prevention.
Consider an isomorphic network G ′, where all such edges are removed (e.g., directed edges from the green to red nodes).
Similarly, in the refined network G ′, we would remove the corresponding edges (e.g., the directed edge from the green to red
nodes).
The particular refinement fr we chose is important because we will still have an ∀∀−abstraction after removing these
edges since each node with such unique behavior rejected the same nodes (due to loops) to accept the worse path. Therefore,
removing the abstract edge and concrete edges remains a universal abstraction.
The same solution L is a solution for the isomorphic SRP where the loop-prevention mechanism for BGP is removed (i.e.,
we don’t block paths with loops). Since we have relative-transfer-equivalence, by removing the loop condition, we get full
transfer-equivalence. We can then simply appeal to Theorem A.5 to derive ∃∀−equivalent and preference-equivalence of L
and L for the isomorphic networks.
Finally, if we add back the abstract edges that we removed, we need to show that we still have the same solution L with
loop-prevention. We do this by showing that such edges would be rejected as loops. Given that we have CP-equivalence, and
in the concrete solution L this edge would result in a loop of the form u,w1, . . . ,wk ,u, we know that the abstract path would
also have a loop fr (u), fr (w1), . . . , fr (wk ), fr (u). □
Next we show the other direction. Note that in both cases, the proof is constructive and thus responsible for identifying the
particular appropriate refinement (fr ,hr ) and (fs ,hs ).
Theorem A.9. Suppose we have well-formed SRP , ŜRP , and SRP for BGP with an effective abstraction (f ,h). For any solution
L to SRP , then there exists a refinement (fr ,hr ) ⊑(fs ,hs ) (f ,h) where L is a solution to SRP , and L and L are label- and
fwd-equivalent.
Proof. Setup fr such that, for each node v that forwards for an attribute that is not the best when ignoring loop-prevention,
we have a single node in v ∈ V map to such a v . For every other node v , that forwards to the best available option, we map
every other v to each of these v . That is, we assign a single concrete node for each unique behavior that is not the best route
and all other nodes map to the abstract node that has the best route.
As before, we remove each edge in SRP that corresponds to an edge rejected due to loops in L, and all corresponding
concrete edges related under fr . As before, in the concrete network, we will still have a ∀∀−abstraction since each concrete
node that forwards to a non-best path does so because the better paths are rejected due to loops.
This network will have the same solution L but has full transfer-equivalence, and we can again appeal to Theorem A.5 for
preference- and CP-equivalence for BGP without loop-prevention.
If we add back the abstract edges that we removed, we need to show that the same solution L is still a solution with
loop-prevention. Suppose that the abstract node u prevented a loop u,w1, . . . ,wk ,u. Then each node u where fr (u) = u that
chose a non-best path in the concrete network also did so due to loop-prevention. □
Corollary A.2. Suppose we have well-formed SRP , ŜRP , and SRP for BGP with an effective abstraction (f ,h). There is a
solution L, where each node u1 7→ û1 forwards along path s = L(u1) . . .L(uk ) to some node uk 7→ ûk iff there is a solution L
where each node u1 7→ û1 forwards along path s = L(u1) . . .L(uk ) to some uk 7→ ûk such that h(s) = hs (s).
Proof. We show each direction separately.
Case (⇒) Suppose L is a solution for SRP . From Theorem A.8, we know there exists a refinement (fr ,hr ) ⊑ (f ,h) of for SRP
with solution L, and also that L and L are fwd-equivalent. Given any two nodes u and v where u can reach v , there exists a
path p = u,w1, . . . ,wk ,v where (u,w1) ∈ fwdL(u) and (wi ,wi+1) ∈ fwdL(wi ) and (wk ,v) ∈ fwdL(wk ). Because L and L are
fwd-equivalent, we know that (fr (u), fr (w1)) ∈ fwdL(fr (u)) and so on. Therefore, there is an abstract path in L where fr (u)
can reach fr (v) of the form fr (u), fr (w1), . . . , fr (wk ), fr (v). Since fr is onto from Theorem A.8, we know that this is the case
for every fr (u) ∈ f −1s (f (u)). Observe that the labels of the concrete path are s = L(u),L(w1), . . . ,L(wk ),L(v). Similarly, the
abstract path has labels L(fr (u)), . . . ,L(fr (v)). Due to label-equivalence, this is the same as hr (L(u)), . . . ,hr (L(v)), which is
just hr (s).
Recall that we must show that hs (s) = h(s) Since we know hr (s) = s , we have hs (hr (s)) = h(s). Finally, because h = hs ◦ hr ,
these are equivalent.
Case (⇐) Suppose L is a solution for SRP , then from TheoremA.8, we know that there exists an onto refinement (fr ,hr ) ⊑ (f ,h)
where L and L are ∃∀−equivalent. Consider an arbitrary path u,w1, . . . ,wk ,v . Then we know (u,w1) ∈ fwdL(u) and so on.
From the fact that L and L are ∃∀−equivalent, every node u that maps to u forwards to the same neighbor. That is, we know
that each u where fr (u) = u, has the same w1 where fr (w1) = w1 and (u,w1) ∈ fwdL(u) and so on. Therefore, each node
u ∈ f −1r (u) has the same path starting afterw1: u,w1, . . . ,wk ,v . The abstract path has labels L(fr (u)), . . . ,L(fr (v)). Due to
label-equivalence, this is the same as hr (L(u)), . . . ,hr (L(v)), which is hr (s).
Once again, we have hs (hr (s)) = h(s), which follows from the fact that h = hs ◦ hr . □
